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Abstract
This article presents a general framework for deconstructing and classifying conflict news narratives. This framework,
based on a nuanced and contextual approach to analyzing media representations of conflict actors and events,
addresses some of the weaknesses of existing classification schemes, focusing in particular on the dualistic approach
of the peace journalism model. Using quantitative content analysis, the proposed framework is then applied to the
journalistic coverage in the Israeli media of three Middle-Eastern conflicts: the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the con-
flict surrounding Iran’s nuclear program, and the Syrian civil war. The coverage is examined in three leading news
outlets – Haaretz, Israel Hayom, and Ynet – over a six-month period. Based on hierarchical cluster analysis, the article
identifies four characteristic types of narratives in the examined coverage. These include two journalistic narratives of
violence: one inward-looking, ethnocentric narrative, and one outward-looking narrative focusing on outgroup actors
and victims; and two political-diplomatic narratives: one interactional, and one outward-looking. In addition to
highlighting different constellations of points of view and conflict measures in news stories, the identified clusters
also challenge several assumptions underlying existing models, such as the postulated alignment between elite/official
actors and violence frames
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The news media constitute a decisive arena where narra-
tives about conflict, war, and peace are constructed and
disseminated to the public. Despite considerable scho-
larly attention to the journalistic coverage of conflicts,
surprisingly few analytical frameworks allow a compre-
hensive classification of conflict coverage, particularly
in connection with its potential contribution to conflict
escalation/maintenance and de-escalation/resolution.
Peace journalism, a notion originating from the work
of Johan Galtung as ‘a normative mode of responsible
and conscientious media coverage of conflict, that aims
at contributing to peacemaking, peacekeeping, and
changing the attitudes of media owners, advertisers,
professionals and audiences towards war and peace’ (Shi-
nar, 2007: 2), has emerged as a prominent classification
framework within journalism studies and peace research.
Galtung distinguished between two distinct modes of
conflict reporting: war/violence journalism and peace
journalism. War/violence journalism treats conflict as a
zero-sum game and is propaganda-oriented, elite-
oriented, and victory oriented. Peace/conflict journalism,
by way of contrast, has a win-win orientation and is
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truth-oriented, people-oriented, and solution-oriented
(Galtung, 1998, 2006). This framework has been oper-
ationalized in a large and growing number of studies,
most of which have demonstrated a dominance of war
frames in the news (de Fransius, 2014; Lee & Maslog,
2005; Shinar, 2009; Workneh, 2011).
However, the framework of peace journalism has also
invited much criticism. It was criticized for its simplistic
epistemological assumptions, gross dualism, advocacy
orientation, normative grounding, and insufficient atten-
tion to the various constraints that shape the reality of
news production (Hanitzsch, 2007a; Loyn, 2007;
Wolfsfeld, 2004). Peace researchers have usefully
addressed some of these concerns at the conceptual,
empirical, and practical levels (Kempf & Shinar, 2014;
Lynch, 2013; Ottosen, 2010; Shinar, 2007). In this arti-
cle, we specifically take issue with peace journalism’s
dualism of war versus peace journalism as the conceptual
lens through which conflict coverage is empirically and
critically examined.
The primary purpose of this article is to advance a
nuanced classification framework that deconstructs con-
flict news narratives while addressing some of the weak-
nesses of existing classification schemes, in particular the
peace journalism framework. For this purpose, we draw
on conflict research in social and political psychology,
political communication, and journalism studies, together
with a conceptualization of news stories as narratives (Bell,
1991; Bird & Dardenne, 2009; Tenenboim-Weinblatt,
2008). We demonstrate and assess the applicability and
utility of this classification framework in an exploratory
manner in the context of the journalistic coverage in
Israeli media of three Middle-Eastern conflicts: the
Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the conflict surrounding Iran’s
nuclear program, and the Syrian civil war.
Conflict news stories as narratives
All conflicts, suggests Cobb (2013: 3), are ‘a function of
the stories that are told, retold, and foretold about the
conflict’. Following the ‘narrative turn’ in social studies
(Czarniawska, 2004), narrative approaches have become
increasingly popular in conflict studies (Cobb, 2013;
Gergen & Gergen, 2006; Maoz, 2011). Spanning across
a range of contexts, from individual storytelling in inter-
group encounters (Bar-On & Kassem, 2004; Ron &
Maoz, 2013) to schoolbook texts and other educational
settings (Adwan, Bar-Tal & Wexler, forthcoming;
Bekerman & Zembylas, 2012), scholars have examined
the characteristics and effects of conflict narratives.
According to these inquiries, such narratives can
contribute to reinforcing conflict-supporting beliefs and
the de-legitimization of the ‘other’, but can also contrib-
ute to conflict resolution and reconciliatory efforts, by
opening opportunities for dialogue, empathy, and sup-
port for peaceful solutions (Bar-Tal, 2013; Bekerman
& Zembylas, 2012; Cobb, 2013; Maoz, 2011).
News narratives have largely remained outside of
these narrative-focused investigations in conflict studies,
in part due to a more individual-psychological orienta-
tion of this scholarship, and in part due to the common
view of news stories as a realm of information on current
events rather than storytelling. However, as communica-
tion and journalism scholars have long argued,
journalists can be viewed as prominent storytellers in
contemporary society, and news coverage, correspond-
ingly, as a form of narrative (Roeh, 1989; Tuchman,
1976). A narrative approach to news suggests that the
news media do not merely convey information but also
participate in the construction, maintenance, and disse-
mination of cultural narratives, which refer to the
group’s myths, values, identity, and view of the world
(Bird & Dardenne, 2009; Carey, 1989; Lule, 2001).
These narratives extend from the present to the past and
the future, linking contemporary events to prior events
and collective memories, as well as to future scenarios
and courses of action (Tenenboim-Weinblatt, 2013;
Tenenboim-Weinblatt & Neiger, 2015). As such,
conflict-related news narratives play an important role
in the public discourse on conflict (Baden, 2014) and
in the social web of conflict narratives within this dis-
course (Bar-Tal, 2013).
Narratives, in our understanding, are conceptually
different from frames, a related and more popular con-
cept in studies of news content in general and conflict
coverage in particular. Framing is commonly understood
as the process through which selected information is
embedded into a coherent interpretative framework
(Baden, 2014; Entman, 1993; Gamson & Modigliani,
1987). The resulting frames differ from narratives in two
major aspects that are relevant to our framework. First,
frames are less accommodating than narratives. They
are ‘central organizing ideas’ (Gamson & Modigliani,
1987), which provide selective interpretations and
evaluations for some specific situation/problem.1 In
contrast, narratives can potentially (though not
1 Our discussion of frames refers to issue-specific frames, which are
also the focus of most studies on news framing of conflicts. Our
conceptual analysis does not apply to the notion of generic frames
(de Vreese, 2005).
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necessarily) include a wide range of voices, events, and
viewpoints (Czarniawska, 2004). Capturing this com-
plexity (or lack thereof) is important in the context of
this study, as it connects to narrative approaches to con-
flict resolution/transformation, which emphasize the
need for ‘opening’ conflict narratives to include differ-
ent voices and viewpoints (Bekerman & Zembylas,
2012; Cobb, 2013).
Second, frames do not have the temporal qualities
that are at the core of common definitions of narratives.
Narratives can be understood as ‘discursive representa-
tions of time-ordered sequences of events’ (Baden,
2014: 11; see also Abbott, 2008; Rimmon-Kenan,
2002), and as such they often connect conflict-related
events from different points in time (from historical
events to future projections; see Bar-Tal, 2013). Frames
may also include past-oriented attribution of responsibil-
ity and future-oriented treatment recommendation (Ent-
man, 1993), but they function within a restricted time
span, focusing on specific events that need to be coher-
ently framed. Narratives can thus be viewed as higher
discursive constructs, which contain and connect specific
frames (Fisher, 1997). Within this framework, conflict
narratives link frames into a chain of connected events
(a plot) and assign specific roles to important conflict
actors (Baden, 2014).
Existing classifications of conflict news
Scholarship on conflict news coverage is abundant, offer-
ing various perspectives and entry points into the subject
matter (for a useful review, see Cottle, 2006). As noted
above, this article is particularly concerned with the con-
ceptual dualism of war versus peace journalism as a
dominant approach to account for different ways of
framing and narrating conflicts in the news. Therefore,
the focus in the review is on key classifications in the
peace journalism framework, and selected additional
scholarship which links to these aspects. The dualism
in the peace journalism approach is strongly spelt out
in Galtung’s (1998: 261) heavily cited framework that
suggests conflict coverage is either ‘peace-oriented’ or
‘war-oriented’, ‘truth-oriented’ or ‘propaganda-oriented’,
‘people-oriented’ or ‘elite-oriented’, and ‘solution-
oriented’ vs. ‘victory-oriented’. To be fair, Galtung him-
self concedes that most media are ‘in-between’ (p. 262),
but this is not how his framework has been applied to the
realities of conflict reporting (de Fransius, 2014; Lee &
Maslog, 2005; Workneh, 2011). While some of these
dualisms were largely discarded in operationalizations
of Galtung’s framework – in particular the truth versus
propaganda distinction – others, as well as the general
framework of peace versus war journalism, have
remained relatively intact.
One such fundamental distinction is between elite
and non-elite actors, with war/violence journalism
being ‘elite-oriented’ and peace journalism being ‘peo-
ple-oriented’ (Galtung, 2006: 1). In studies which
operationalized the peace journalism framework, the
indicator of elite orientation has been central in clas-
sifying a news story as belonging to ‘war journalism’.
Based on the assumption that ‘the more the coverage
relies on elite and official sources, the more it displays
a tendency towards war’ (Workneh, 2011: 46), exam-
inations of the media coverage of diverse conflicts
consistently found that reliance on elite/official
sources was one of the most salient indicators of war
journalism (e.g. Lee & Maslog, 2005; Shinar, 2009;
Workneh, 2011). In studies examining the level of
press independence, political communication scholars
similarly found a dominance of government sources
and frames in conflict coverage (Bennett, Lawrence
& Livingston, 2007; Robinson et al., 2009). Indeed,
the general tendency of the news media to rely on
official/elite sources (Bennett, 1990; Gans, 1979)
seems to be even more pronounced in conflict situa-
tions, where demands for patriotism and authoritative
information move to the forefront (Cottle, 2006;
Zandberg & Neiger, 2005).
However, the elite vs. non-elite actor classification
mechanism, particularly in the context of peace journal-
ism, raises several difficulties. First, it disregards the con-
text in which official sources are used. Are all references
to official sources equal? Should calls for violence and
peace by official sources be classified under the same
category within a peace journalism framework? Second,
it disregards the salience of the references within the
story. Should the appearance of elite or non-elite actors
in the headlines have the same weight as a passing refer-
ence to them at the end of the story (often out of a need
for balance)? Third, it obscures important distinctions
within the non-elite group. For example, should foot sol-
diers or armed rebels be coded the same way as ordinary
citizens or NGO members in the context of peaceful ver-
sus violent narratives?
Another actor-based distinction that is central to
peace journalism concerns the representation of different
sides of the conflict. In Galtung’s (1998: 261) frame-
work, the subcategories of ‘‘‘us–them’’ journalism’, ‘voice
for ‘‘us’’’, and ‘dehumanization of ‘‘them’’’ are defining
features of war journalism, while peace journalism is
associated with ‘giving voice to all parties’ and
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‘humanization of all sides’. As suggested by Zandberg &
Neiger (2005), journalists can be seen as serving two
masters, through being members of ‘contradicting com-
munities’ – the professional and the national. While the
professional community adheres to values such as objec-
tivity, neutrality, balance, and criticism, the national
community demands solidarity. In times of crisis and
war, the pendulum often swings toward a more
patriotic-ethnocentric mode of coverage (Cottle, 2006;
Schudson, 2002), resulting in a positive representation
of ‘our’ ethno-national group, and marginalization or
demonization of the ‘other’ group (Carter, Thomas &
Ross, 2011; Liebes, 1997; Steuter & Wills, 2010). Yet,
recent studies suggest that during the 21st century,
media representations of conflicts around the world tend
to give more visibility to the other side in conflict
(Kampf & Liebes, 2013), and to use non-domestic
sources more generally (Hayes & Guardino, 2010). For
instance, in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian con-
flict, Israeli media started giving more visibility and voice
to Palestinian actors (Balmas, Sheafer, & Wolfsfeld,
2015; Kampf & Liebes, 2013). Notably, these new
trends have been primarily documented in the context
of the level rather than the nature of the representation.
Media representations of victims in a conflict are par-
ticularly important in the context of us–them construc-
tions. While war journalism, in Galtung’s (1998: 261)
terms, focuses on the victims and the suffering on ‘our’
side, peace journalism emphasizes the ‘suffering all over’.
And indeed, research points to a clear difference between
the representation of ‘our’ victims and ‘others’’ victims.
Wolfsfeld, Frosh & Awabdy (2008) argue that when
one’s own citizens are hurt, the news media employ a
‘victims mode’ of reporting – which personalizes the vic-
tim – but when injuries and loss of life on the other side
are inflicted by the own group, the news media tend to
use a ‘defensive mode’ of reporting, by depersonalizing
the victims. At the same time, there is evidence for a
greater focus on victims on all sides of conflicts in con-
temporary news coverage, due to profound changes in
the global media environment (Kampf & Liebes,
2013; Orgad & Seu, 2014).
The countervailing trends in the representation of dif-
ferent conflict parties, on top of the tension between pro-
fessional and national loyalties of journalists, leave open
questions as to the classification of different dimensions
of the respective representations and their interplay. For
instance: does greater visibility necessarily mean more
positive portrayals? And where do we locate negative por-
trayals of the ingroup in relation to peace versus war
journalism?
With regard to classifications of reported, conflict-
related events, the peace journalism framework
focuses on two major categories: events associated
with violence and war, and those associated with
peace initiatives and processes (Galtung, 1998,
2006). The normative expectation is that instead of
the prevalent emphasis in the news on violent events,
the news media would give more emphasis to negoti-
ations and peace initiatives (e.g. Galtung, 2006; Shi-
nar, 2009). This approach was criticized for its
advocacy orientation (Loyn, 2007), as well as for pay-
ing insufficient attention to the various constraints
and values that shape news production (Hanitzsch,
2007a; Wolfsfeld, 2004). Furthermore, this classifica-
tion does not only obscure the likely coexistence of
the two orientations in news stories (as in reports
on political debates about the preferred course of
action), but also the existence of other, middle-
ground realms of conflict management, such as polit-
ical and economic pressures.
Finally, a key distinction in the peace journalism
framework is made between a focus of war journalism
on the here-and-now versus a focus of peace journalism
on the causes and consequences of the events, including
historical and cultural contexts (Galtung, 1998, 2006).
Indeed, as in the case of reliance on official sources, a
focus on here-and-now events was found to be one of the
most salient indicators of war journalism (Lee & Maslog,
2005; Shinar, 2009). However, the social meaning of
context and consequences may depend on the context.
Collective memory of past traumas and rivals’ conflicting
versions of the historical causes of conflicts can be detri-
mental to conflict resolution (see Bar-Tal, 2013). Simi-
larly, future scenarios which foreground violence or
negate the possibility of peace are not necessarily condu-
cive to conflict resolution. The news media, which serve
as narrators of the present, agents of collective memory
(Zelizer & Tenenboim-Weinblatt, 2014), and shapers
of future scenarios and agendas (Neiger, 2007;
Tenenboim-Weinblatt & Neiger, 2015), can construct
both positive and negative longitudinal narratives (Cot-
tle, 2006).
In summation, peace journalism and other related fra-
meworks offer valuable distinctions and important
insights regarding the narration and framing of conflict
news stories. At the same time, by often glossing over rel-
evant subdistinctions, the context in which specific con-
tent elements are positioned within the news story, and
the interplay between the different elements, they do not
sufficiently account for the complexity of conflict
coverage.
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Towards a new classification approach: An
actor-event framework
The classification framework advanced by this article is
based on a comprehensive deconstruction of conflict-
related news narratives (see Figure 1). Following a defini-
tion of narratives as discursive representations of
sequences of events, which commonly focus on the
actions of specific actors (see Abbott, 2008; Baden,
2014; Rimmon-Kenan, 2002), we categorize conflict
coverage based on the depicted actors and events – the
two building blocks of any narrative. The proposed
framework attempts to address the weaknesses identified
above in existing approaches by offering more complex
categories and more nuanced distinctions in relation to
the actors and the conflict-related events depicted in
news stories. Furthermore, this framework suggests a
contextual approach, based on a compositional logic.
Following the criticisms discussed above, we argue that
what is important is not only if specific dimensions are
present or not, but how different dimensions are linked
to one another and grouped together within specific nar-
ratives. For instance, which conflict actors are portrayed
in the context of different types of events? What is the
interplay between different dimensions of actors’ repre-
sentation, and which realms of events are grouped
together?
Actors in conflict coverage
For conflict actors, the classification framework first
distinguishes between ingroup and outgroup actors.
This distinction, which is fundamental in narrative
approaches to conflict (Bar-On, 2008; Bar-Tal, 2013;
Bekerman & Zembylas, 2012; Ron & Maoz, 2013),
allows us to evaluate the representation of different sides
of the conflict in news narratives, while taking into
account the position of the examined news media in rela-
tion to the conflict (a dimension which is often ignored
in studies employing the peace journalism framework).
Within this framework, ingroup actors are those who
belong to the country/group where the news outlet
operates.
In both ingroup and outgroups, there is a wide array
of actors who populate conflict coverage (Kampf &
Liebes, 2013): a sole classification into establishment
vs. non-establishment actors does not do full justice to
the more complex realities of conflict. Thus, we identify
four categories of subgroups: (1) establishment actors,
consisting of political officials as well as other state offi-
cials (including the high command of the army); (2)
armed forces, consisting of soldiers, police, armed
resistance groups, and other militants; (3) civil society
actors, consisting of members of conflict-related NGOs
and other private organizations (who appear in the news
story in association with their membership in the respec-
tive organization); and (4) lay publics, consisting of ordi-
nary citizens and other private individuals, including
victims of violence.
Our classification framework evaluates a range of tex-
tual dimensions in relation to the actors portrayed. We
examine (a) the diversity and visibility of the different
types of actors; (b) characterization; and (c) the level of
information about victims.
Diversity and visibility. This dimension addresses the
range of actors from the different subgroups that appear
in the news narrative (diversity), and the level of atten-
tion given to each subgroup in the story (visibility). Giv-
ing voice to a range of actors is a normative demand that
links to the peace journalism framework (Galtung, 2006)
and narrative approaches to conflict resolution (Cobb,
2013), as well as to journalistic norms (see Baden &
Springer, 2014). At the same time, even when different
types of actors are represented in the story, some actors
are given more prominence through journalistic quoting
practices and editorial selections (Dor, 2005). Thus, vis-
ibility in the suggested framework reflects the extent to
which different subgroups are present in different textual
elements of the news story, from headlines and pictures
to quotes and descriptions in the main text.
Characterization of ingroup and outgroup actors. As
argued above, a systematic distinction should be made














and outgroup actors and 










In four major realms: 
Violence and military action
Political and economic 
measures
Ceasefire and avoidance of 
violence
Dialogue, gestures, peace 
negotiations
Salience of event 
realms




Figure 1. Classification framework
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actors. Furthermore, there is a need to account for pos-
itive and negative representations of both ingroup and
outgroup actors. Thus, in addition to examining the level
of visibility given to different actors, we examine the
degree to which they are portrayed in a positive or neg-
ative light.
Identified victims. Within the different subgroups, the
representation of ‘our’ and ‘others’’ victims has special
importance. Given the growing body of literature on the
‘identified victim effect’ (Kogut & Ritov, 2005; Slovic,
2007),2 and against the background of the growing vis-
ibility of victims in conflict coverage (Kampf & Liebes,
2013), there is a need for a systematic evaluation of the
different levels of victim representation in relation to dif-
ferent types of reference groups. The suggested frame-
work therefore also looks specifically at the level of
information supplied on ‘our’ and ‘others’’ victims.
Events in conflict coverage
While the peace journalism framework focuses on two
major realms of events that journalists can report on (vio-
lence and war versus peace initiatives and processes), we
suggest distinguishing between four main domains: (1)
violence and military action (warfare, military opera-
tions, terrorist attacks); (2) economic, political, and
media measures (economic sanctions, political pressures,
propaganda); (3) ceasefires and maintenance of nonvio-
lence; and (4) gestures, dialogue, and peace negotiations.
The first and second realms address distinct forms of
coercive power: physical violence versus the application
of non-military measures, whereas the third and fourth
realms represent distinct forms of nonviolence: the
non-application of violence (i.e. nonviolence without
peace) versus active, peace-oriented measures. Further-
more, we do not assume that news narratives necessarily
belong to only one of these realms exclusively. Rather,
we examine the grouping of these different realms in
journalistic coverage through a cluster analysis approach.
The four realms of events are appraised with respect to
three dimensions: (a) their salience in the narrative; (b)
support for actions in the respective realms; and (c) the
complexity of attribution of responsibility to the
depicted events (see Figure 1).
Salience of event realms. Conflict narratives can operate
in different timescales (Bar-Tal, 2013), from narratives
that connect to the realm of collective memory, through
narratives focusing on recent events, to future scenarios
(Tenenboim-Weinblatt & Neiger, 2015). In determin-
ing the salience of the four different realms of events in
conflict narratives, we look at both the main topic of the
news story and the degree to which the four realms of
events appear in different temporal layers of the story:
the distant past (history/collective memory), mid-range
past (the last few years), recent events (the last few days),
near future (the next few days/weeks), and the far future.
The degree of salience is determined by the centrality of
the relevant realm of events, from ‘low salience’, that is,
no events/scenarios in this realm appear in the news
story, to ‘high salience’, that is, events/scenarios belong-
ing to this realm are not only the main topic of the item,
but are also represented as dominant in both past depic-
tions and future scenarios of the conflict. This aspect
addresses the problem of dualism associated with the dis-
tinction in the peace journalism framework between a
focus of war journalism on the here-and-now and a focus
of peace journalism on the causes and consequences
of the events, including historical contexts (Galtung,
1998, 2006).
Supported courses of action. In a similar vein, in order
to capture the context in which these realms are situated
it is important to examine whether references to future
scenarios and events in the different realms are discussed
as desirable (i.e. such that should be strived for), or as
undesirable (i.e. such that should be avoided). Expres-
sions of support or opposition to particular courses of
action can be part of the news media’s functioning as a
forum for public debate or part of journalists’ own
advocacy in more interventionist journalistic cultures
(see Hanitzsch, 2007b). Our classification framework
addresses such expressions of support or opposition in
relation to each of the four realms, ranging from violence
and military action to negotiations and peace processes.
Attribution of responsibility. In conflict narratives,
parties of all sides tend to externalize responsibility, pre-
senting the other side as responsible for the conflict and
for specific events in it (Cobb, 2013). This pattern can
also be found in news narratives (e.g. Ariyanto et al.,
2008), as attribution of responsibility is a central func-
tion of news frames (Entman, 1993; Matthes & Kohr-
ing, 2008), as well as a central element in media
frames advanced by different sides of the conflict (Shea-
fer et al., 2014). Narrative approaches to conflict
2 The ‘identified victim effect’ suggests that people’s compassion and
willingness to act against suffering is much higher when victims are
given a name, a face, and other identification/personalization details.
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resolution suggest that the goal should not necessarily be
to internalize responsibility instead of externalizing it,
but rather to strive for narratives of mutual responsi-
bility, where responsibility is both internalized and
externalized (Cobb, 2013). Our classification frame-
work therefore accounts for the complexity of attribu-
tions of responsibility in news stories by looking into
whether news stories assign responsibility to one or
more parties.
Research questions
In the following sections, we assess the applicability of
our framework and demonstrate its utility for analyzing
Israeli news coverage of three Middle-Eastern conflicts:
the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the conflict surrounding
Iran’s nuclear program, and the Syrian civil war. Our pri-
mary research question in the empirical part of this paper
focuses on the main types of news narratives in conflict
coverage:
RQ1: Which narrative clusters emerge from an analysis
of Israeli news coverage of the above-mentioned three
conflicts?
Two additional questions examine the relative preva-
lence of these narratives in different media outlets and
conflicts:
RQ2a: To what extent do different media outlets
employ different hierarchies of narrative clusters?
RQ2b: To what extent do different conflicts generate
different hierarchies of narrative clusters?
The intention of this article is not to empirically test
or validate the above advanced actor-event approach but
to demonstrate its utility for the empirical identification
of conflict news narratives and their properties. Cluster
analysis, the analytical strategy we employed, is essen-
tially a descriptive technique to classify objects based
on a set of specified properties (our classification frame-
work outlined above). The actor-event approach we
advance in this paper can be said to be useful if it yields
a structure of meaningful clusters that contribute, con-
ceptually and empirically, to our understanding of con-
flict news narratives.
Method
Our empirical investigation focused on the coverage of
three Middle-Eastern conflicts in the Israeli news media
over a period of six months (July–December 2012). In
looking at three different conflicts – the Israeli–Pales-
tinian conflict, the conflict surrounding Iran’s nuclear
program, and the Syrian civil war – over a shared period of
time that encompassed a wide range of military and dip-
lomatic events, we aimed to capture a broad spectrum
of conflict coverage as a basis for classification.3
The three conflicts that the study focuses on were
selected to maximize diversity within a shared frame-
work. All three are contemporary Middle-Eastern polit-
ical conflicts with a ‘system/ideology’ dimension in
which some conflict actors strive for ‘a change of the
ideological, religious, socioeconomic or judicial orienta-
tion of the political system or changing the regime type
itself’ (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict
Research, 2011: 108). However, within this shared
framework there is high variability. The Syrian and Ira-
nian conflicts represent, respectively, intrastate vs. inter-
state conflicts, while the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is
between a state and a non-state group (in the context
of an occupation). This difference is also associated with
different positions of the Israeli media toward the con-
flicts: while Israel is a direct party to the conflict in the
Palestinian and Iranian cases, it is not a main participant
in the Syrian conflict (although it is potentially affected
by it, and it carried out airstrikes in Syria several times
during the war). The three conflicts also differ in their
intensity and dynamics over time: the Israeli–Palestinian
conflict is a protracted, intractable conflict, with cycles of
escalation and de-escalation; the Iranian conflict is based
on a long-term tension with threats for future escalation
and violence; and the Syrian conflict is based on a quick
eruption of a high level of violence.
Our media sample included three leading news out-
lets in Israel – Haaretz, Israel Hayom, and Ynet – repre-
senting a combination of quality and tabloid
newspapers, as well as different political orientations.
Haaretz is considered the national elite newspaper
(often compared to the New York Times), Israel Hayom
3 In the decades-long Israeli–Palestinian conflict, key events in the
chosen period of time included the decision to accord Palestine
Non-Member Observer State status in the UN, and an eight-day
Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip (‘Pillar of Defense’), which
consisted primarily of Israeli airstrikes in Gaza and rockets fired
from Gaza to Israel. Six Israelis and 167 Palestinians were killed in
this operation, which ended with a ceasefire. In the Syrian civil
war, which started in March 2011, the chosen period was shortly
after a ceasefire attempt, and included several key battles and
offensives. By the end of 2012, more than 40,000 people were
killed in this war. Key events in the conflict surrounding Iran’s
nuclear program during this period included the publication of
several reports regarding Iran’s uranium enrichment capabilities,
negotiations between Iran and the P5þ1, and an ongoing debate
in Israel over military action against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.
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is the most widely circulated newspaper in Israel, and
Ynet – the Internet portal of the Yedioth Ahronoth
Group – is the most popular Israeli news website. Haar-
etz represents a left-liberal editorial line, whereas Israel
Hayom, owned by the conservative Jewish-American
billionaire Sheldon Adelson, is known for its alignment
with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his gov-
ernment’s policies. Ynet generally adopts a mainstream-
centrist editorial line.
The sampling frame was created based on a keyword
search4 in the digital archives of the three news outlets
for all relevant conflict-related items in the examined
period. This search yielded a total of 2,728 items:
1,198 for the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, 792 for the
Iranian conflict, and 738 for the Syrian conflict. For
our sample, we randomly selected from the complete
list 60 items for each conflict in each news outlet,
resulting in a total of 540 news items (three conflicts
 three news outlets  60). Of these, 60 randomly
selected items were double coded for evaluating interco-
der reliability.
Media coverage was coded based on a nuanced coding
scheme that deconstructed the narrative components of
conflict-related news stories. The coding scheme was
tested and refined until Cohen’s Kappa coefficient for
intercoder reliability reached a minimum of 0.7 for all
questions. Final reliability scores ranged from 0.72 to
0.97. In all, 19 composite variables were constructed
from the coding book’s dozens of questions. These vari-
ables correspond to the six subdimensions presented in
Figure 1: visibility and diversity of actors (six variables),
characterization of ingroup and outgroup actors (two
variables), level of information on victims (two vari-
ables), salience of different realms of events (four vari-
ables), support for different courses of action (four
variables), and complexity of responsibility attributions
(one variable). The composite variables are presented
in detail in Table I. Note that we define the ingroup
in this framework as referring to actors from the country
where the news outlet is located (in our context: Israeli
actors) and the outgroup as referring to actors from the
relevant non-Israeli conflict society (i.e. Palestinian,
Iranian, or Syrian actors). The 19 variables were then
entered into a hierarchical cluster analysis (Ward’s
method – squared Euclidean distance) to identify pat-
terns of narratives in the coverage.5 Following a classifi-
cation of the sample as a whole, aimed at identifying
characteristic types of narrative across conflicts, we
repeated the clustering procedure within conflicts.
Results
A four-cluster solution was selected for a combination of
interpretability and statistical properties. Table II shows
the means of the 19 variables for each of the resulting
narrative clusters, as well as their overall means. One-
way F tests and Tukey HSD post-hoc tests were used
to determine which classifying variables produced signif-
icant differences between the clusters and where the dif-
ferences lie. The F tests show that 16 of the variables
meaningfully discriminate between the four clusters. The
three variables that do not distinguish between the
groups (i.e. have non-significant F values) are the charac-
terization of the ingroup, salience of the ceasefire/non-
violence realm, and support for economic/political
measures. Two other variables – total number of sub-
groups and attribution of responsibility – significantly
distinguish between the clusters (in particular Cluster 4
versus the others), but the small differences do not lend
themselves to a substantive interpretation.
The four identified narrative clusters include two
political-diplomatic narratives (Clusters 1 and 2) and
two violence-centered narratives (Clusters 3 and 4). The
two clusters in the violence realm are characterized by
high salience of events and scenarios associated with vio-
lence and military action. However, these two narrative
clusters are different in their viewpoint or direction of
gaze. One is inward-looking, ethnocentric narrative,
focusing on ‘our’ actors and victims (Cluster 3). This
cluster thus has, on average, the highest positive differ-
ence between the numbers of ingroup and outgroup
actors, as well as the highest level of information on
ingroup victims. The other violence-centered cluster
(Cluster 4) is outward-looking, focusing on outgroup
actors, including others’ victims. It thus has the highest
negative difference between the numbers of ingroup and
outgroup actors, as well as the highest level of informa-
tion on outgroup victims.
The two political-diplomatic narrative clusters are
both marked by high salience of events associated with
economic and political measures. However, one is again4 The selection of search terms was a result of a long, systematic process
aimed at determining and validating the optimal keywords for producing
the most exhaustive and accurate sampling frame for each conflict. The
final search terms (translated from Hebrew) were the following:
‘Palestin*&(conflict|intifada|peace|negotiations|operation|attack)’;
‘Syria&(war|fight*|protest*|uprising)’; ‘Iran & nuclear*’.
5 The clustering of news stories follows the procedure suggested by
Matthes & Kohring (2008), with the difference of clustering
narrative components rather than framing elements.
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outward-looking, dealing with others’ politics and diplo-
macy (Cluster 2), while the other (Cluster 1) is interac-
tional. Cluster 1 is thus the most balanced in its level of
representation of ingroup and outgroup actors, as well as
highest in the realm of dialogue, gestures, and peace
negotiations.
With regard to the visibility of different types of sub-
groups, establishment actors are found to be the most




Visibility: establishment 0–8: From low to high visibility. An aggregate variable based on
the existence of references to the relevant subgroup in four
textual elements: headlines, full text, pictures, and quotes. 0:
no references to the relevant subgroup in the article; 8: the





Difference between number of
actors in ingroup and
outgroup
–4–4: From a high focus on the outgroup with no references to
ingroup actors, to a high focus on the ingroup with no
references to outgroup actors. 0 represents a balanced
representation of ingroup and outgroup actors. Differential
variable, calculated by subtracting the number of Palestinian,
Iranian or Syrian subgroups (0–4) from the number of Israeli
subgroups that appear in the item (0–4).
Total number of subgroups Total number of subgroups, including also third-party countries
and international organizations (in addition to ingroup actors
and actors from the relevant outgroup conflict society).
Actors: characterization Characterization of ingroup –4–4: from highly negative to highly positive representation.
Based on explicit positive and negative references to the four
types of subgroups (establishment, civil society, armed forces,
and lay publics) in the ingroup and relevant outgroup.
Differential variable, based on the difference between the level
of positive representation (0–4; from no positive
representation to positive representation of all four subgroups)
and negative representation (0–4).
Characterization of outgroup
Actors: identified victims Level of information on victims:
ingroup
0–6: From low to high level of information. An aggregate
variable based on the existence of references to (a) victims from
the ingroup/outgroups; (b) the number of victims; (c) pictures
of victims; (d) names of victims; (e) sociodemographic
attributes of the victims; and (f) life circumstances and/or
emotional state of the victims. A value of 6 suggests a
representation of victims that includes all informational
dimensions.
Level of information on victims:
outgroup
Events: salience of different
realms of events/
measures
Violence and military action 0–6: From low to high centrality of the relevant realm of events.
0: no events/scenarios in this realm appear in the news story; 6:
events/scenarios belonging to this realm are not only the main
topic of the item, but are also represented as dominant in both




Events: level of support for
different courses of
action
Support: violence –2 to 2: From strong opposition to strong support. Calculated as
the differential between expressions of support (0–2) and
opposition (0–2) in relation to expected events or advocated
measures. –2: no expression of support in the article and
expression of opposition in the headlines/lead; 0: balanced or






Events: responsibility Complexity of attribution of
responsibility
0–3: From low to high complexity. Ranges from no attribution
of responsibility through one-sided responsibility to bi- and
multi-party responsibility.
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dominant subgroup in news stories overall, while civil
society is the least visible subgroup. However, the visibi-
lity of the different subgroups varies across clusters:
establishment actors are most dominant in the peace-
oriented cluster (Cluster 1), while civil society and lay
publics are significantly more dominant in the violent
narratives.
Notably, the data also show a general negativity trend,
applying to both ingroup and outgroup actors. As
expected, characterization of the ingroup is generally
more positive than representations of outgroups. How-
ever, ingroup characterization is still on the negative side
in the sample as a whole and in three of the four clusters.
The exception is Cluster 3 – the inward looking, ethno-
centric narrative – where ingroup representation is more
positive on average. Interestingly, it is also only in Clus-
ter 3 that there are on average more ingroup than out-
group subgroups in a given news story. In all other
Table II. Narrative clusters



























(n ¼ 540) F value
Conflict actors
Visibility: establishment 5.43a (1.23) 3.25b (1.30) 3.19b (1.91) 4.10c (1.55) 4.19 (1.72) 72.97**
Visibility: civil society 0.11a (0.42) 0.19a (0.58) 0.92b (1.23) 0.65c (0.99) 0.40 (0.87) 25.72**
Visibility: armed forces 0.41a (0.78) 0.33a (0.62) 2.36b (1.57) 2.17b (1.21) 1.17 (1.38) 143.64**
Visibility: lay publics 0.53a (0.78) 1.09b (1.32) 3.21c (1.62) 1.93d (1.11) 1.45 (1.47) 107.60**
Difference between ingroup
and outgroup
0.10a (0.90) 0.95b (1.16) 1.30c (1.04) 2.21d (1.33) 0.71 (1.61) 193.24**
Total number of subgroups 5.28a (1.57) 4.84a (1.42) 5.25a (1.92) 6.75b (1.68) 5.58 (1.78) 39.17**
Level of information on victims:
ingroup
0.10a (0.44) 0.04a (0.26) 2.69b (2.14) 0.12a (0.50) 0.46 (1.27) 185.28**
Level of information on victims:
outgroup
0.11a (0.46) 0.62b (1.07) 1.55c (1.59) 2.85d (1.38) 1.22 (1.58) 180.60**
Characterization of ingroup
(from negative to positive)
0.01 (0.76) 0.11 (0.56) 0.04 (1.19) 0.01 (0.65) 0.03 (0.76) 0.81
Characterization of outgroup
(from negative to positive)
0.60a (0.72) 0.37a (0.92) 0.49a (0.99) 1.12b (0.89) 0.67 (0.90) 20.52**
Conflict events
Attribution of responsibility 1.53a (0.67) 1.47a (0.67) 1.30 (0.70) 1.15b (0.69) 1.38 (0.67) 9.93**
Salience: violence and military
action
1.60a (1.52) 1.04b (1.12) 2.35c (1.23) 2.46c (1.36) 1.81 (1.46) 32.14**
Salience: economic, political
and media measures
1.43a (1.51) 1.55a (1.37) 0.45b (0.97) 0.58b (0.97) 1.08 (1.35) 24.69**
Salience: ceasefire, nonviolence 0.19 (0.63) 0.25 (0.72) 0.18 (0.45) 0.21 (0.73) 0.21 (0.66) 0.28
Salience: dialogue, gestures,
peace negotiations
0.43a (1.02) 0.18b (0.59) 0.13b (0.52) 0.08b (0.38) 0.23 (0.72) 7.30**
Support: violence and military
action (from strong
opposition to strong support)
0.40a (0.89) 0.19 (0.62) 0.01b (0.64) 0.07b (0.77) 0.20 (0.77) 7.36**
Support: economic, political
and media measures
0.11 (0.62) 0.03 (0.53) 0.01 (0.30) 0.07 (0.36) 0.06 (0.49) 0.95
Support: ceasefire, nonviolence 0.06 (0.30) 0.01a (0.19) 0.12b (0.40) 0.07 (0.32) 0.05 (0.30) 3.11*
Support: dialogue, gestures,
peace negotiations
0.23a (0.61) 0.06b (0.29) 0.04b (0.19) 0.01b (0.33) 0.10 (0.44) 9.13**
a, b, c, d Significant differences between clusters at p < 0.05, based on Tukey’s HSD (Honestly Significant Difference) test; *p < 0.05;
**p < 0.001.
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clusters, there are on average more outgroup actors (as
indicated by the negative value of the Difference between
ingroup and outgroup variable).
An examination of the presence of the four narrative
clusters in the different news outlets suggests that while
each cluster was present in each of the three outlets (with
a minimum of 11% of the total number of items in each
outlet), there were also some noteworthy differences
among the three outlets in the prevalence of the different
clusters. In the highbrow, left-leaning Haaretz, the
diplomatic-interactional narrative (Cluster 1) is some-
what more prevalent than in the two other news outlets:
35% of the sampled news items belong to this cluster in
Haaretz, in comparison to 32% in Ynet and 31% in
Israel Hayom. At the same time, together with Ynet,
Haaretz is characterized by a higher prevalence of the
violence-centered, outward-looking narrative (Cluster
4) in relation to Israel Hayom (31% vs. 23%, respec-
tively). In terms of the classification variables, one of the
major differences that this finding reflects is the signifi-
cantly higher level of information on outgroup victims
in Haartez and Ynet in comparison to Israel Hayom.
Interestingly, however, Ynet is also characterized by the
highest level of information on ingroup victims among
the three outlets, which partly explains why it also has
the highest percentage of items belonging to the
inward-looking violence-centered narrative (Cluster 3).
These findings may reflect the more general tendency
of Ynet toward personalization, also indicated by the
greater salience of lay publics in its stories (in comparison
to the other news outlets). The overall relationship
between the clusters and the news outlet is statistically
significant (X2 ¼ 19.23; d.f. ¼ 6; n ¼ 540; p < .01).
The differences between the three conflicts in relation
to the four narrative clusters are even more pronounced
(X2¼ 301.12; d.f.¼ 6; n¼ 540; p < .001). As suggested
by Table III, the coverage of the Israeli–Palestinian con-
flict during the examined time period was most varied
in relation to the four clusters: the most dominant
cluster – the violence-centered inward-looking narra-
tive – accounts for about 37% of the coverage, while the
other three clusters account for between 18% and 25%
of the news stories. In contrast, the coverage of the Ira-
nian and Syrian conflicts heavily concentrates on specific
clusters: the political-diplomatic narratives in the Iranian
case and the violence-centered outward-looking narrative
in the Syrian case.
In addition to looking at the distribution of the four
identified clusters across the three conflicts, we also
examined which narrative clusters emerged when hier-
archical cluster analysis was run separately for each con-
flict. The results suggest that the Palestinian and Syrian
conflicts follow a structure similar to the cross-conflict
classification: the resulting narratives are based on a
matrix of viewpoints (inward/outward looking) and a
focus on violence/military action versus politics/diplo-
macy (albeit with different emphases in relation to the
cross-conflict classification, such as more emphasis on
ceasefire/maintaining nonviolence in the Israeli–Palesti-
nian conflict within the political-diplomatic clusters).
The Iranian case provides an example where the different
realms of events/measures take precedence over actor
variables in distinguishing between the clusters (as the
actors remain relatively stable across the coverage, with
a continuous emphasis on official actors). The main
news narratives in the Iranian case are thus distinctly
clustered around three types of conflict management
measures: (a) violence/military action (44% of the items,
referring to military measures and scenarios where vio-
lence was initiated by Iran, Israel or third parties); (b)
political-economic measures (51%, focusing primarily
on economic sanctions against Iran); and (c) the realm
of dialogue and negotiations (5%). Unlike the more
complex picture emerging from the cross-conflict classi-
fication, this internal classification of the Iranian conflict
can be more readily understood as a continuum of a
peace journalism framework (which can be achieved
when the actors are kept relatively constant). It is also









(1) Political-diplomatic interactional narrative 25.0% 61.1% 11.7%
(2) Political-diplomatic outward-looking narrative 18.3% 34.4% 21.7%
(3) Violence-centered inward-looking narrative 36.7% 2.2% 3.9%
(4) Violence-centered outward-looking narrative 20.0% 2.2% 62.8%
Total 100% 100% 100%
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noteworthy that while the stories about the Iranian con-
flict overwhelmingly belong to the political-diplomatic
clusters in the general sample (see Table III), in the inter-
nal clustering procedure one of the resulting clusters has
an emphasis on violence/military action. This finding
underscores the fact that the violent realm is by no means
absent from the political-diplomatic general clusters (as
clearly seen in Table II). However, violence is mostly dis-
cussed rather than enacted, as one among many possible
courses of action. The internal clustering of the coverage
of the Iranian conflict reveals that the nonviolent solu-
tions had the slight upper hand in the narration of the
story in the Israeli media (as in reality).
Discussion
The purpose of this article was to present a nuanced clas-
sification framework that deconstructs conflict news nar-
ratives while it addresses some of the weaknesses of
existing classification schemes, in particular the peace
journalism framework. Another aim was to apply this
classification framework to the analysis of news coverage
of three Middle Eastern conflicts in the Israeli media.
The proposed classification framework integrates and
adapts components and insights of existing frameworks,
while going beyond existing approaches. First, it offers a
nuanced approach to evaluating the representation of
conflict actors and events, which escapes the dualist
nature of the peace journalism indicators. Second, it pro-
vides a more contextual approach – within individual
dimensions (for example, by taking into account the
positioning of the news outlet vis-à-vis the conflict, or
the nature of the discussed context and consequences
in the article), as well as in the interrelations among the
different dimensions. The latter is achieved by connect-
ing actors and events and replacing the predetermined
nature and additive logic of the peace journalism frame-
work with an inductive, compositional logic. Third, our
classification framework does not suggest that any of the
resulting narratives is necessarily more valid, truthful, or
propagandist than the others.
On the empirical level, we find that the constellations
of viewpoints and conflict events presented in the news
are more complex than usually presented in research.
This is most pronounced in relation to the postulated
alignment between elite/official actors and violence
frames (Galtung, 2006; Lee & Maslog, 2005; Workneh,
2011). In accordance with the literature, establishment
actors are found to be the most dominant subgroup in
news stories, and violence and military action form the
most dominant realm of events. However, establishment
actors are most dominant in the most peace-oriented
narrative. Here, our findings challenge the peace journal-
ism model, where the presence of elite/official actors is
used as an indicator for war journalism. The presence
of different subgroups, our findings suggest, should be
considered against the context in which they appear.
Our findings also complicate arguments about bal-
ance in conflict coverage and the relationship between
ingroup and outgroup representations. Of particular
interest in this context is the finding that while the rep-
resentation of ingroup actors is not as negative as that of
outgroup actors, it is still slightly negative on average
(except in the inward-looking narrative). This not only
supports arguments about general negativity trends in
the news (Soroka, 2014; Wolfsfeld, 2004), but suggests
that while journalists and the news may not be balanced,
they also do not abandon a critical stance. ‘Rallying
around the flag’ and loyalty to the national group (Zand-
berg & Neiger, 2005) are thus apparent in our sample
only to a limited degree. This may be attributed to the
range and type of conflict phases included in the sample,
the relatively small number of Israeli casualties during
this period, and the inclusion of the Syrian case, where
Israel is not a main participant in the conflict. Applying
this framework to the coverage of the 2014 Gaza war, for
example, would likely produce somewhat different
results.
In addition, the finding about the greater emphasis on
outgroup actors in relation to ingroup actors is in accor-
dance with the trend identified in recent scholarship of
giving increasing visibility to ‘the other’/non-domestic
voices in the Israeli media (Balmas, Sheafer & Wolfsfeld,
2015; Kampf & Liebes, 2013). However, bringing the
visibility and negativity trends together suggests that
greater visibility of the other side is not necessarily
accompanied by a more empathetic representation. It
is thus important to include in evaluations of conflict
coverage measures of both salience and characteriza-
tion/tone.
The differences found among media outlets with
regard to the narrative clusters are in accordance with the
editorial lines of the respective news organizations (e.g.
more emphasis in Haaretz on the most peace-oriented
cluster), as well as their news values and narrative style
(e.g. greater focus in Ynet on personal stories of victims).
In a similar vein, the substantial differences between the
three conflicts in the hierarchies of narrative clusters cor-
respond to the specific characteristics of the conflicts and
Israel’s position in relation to them. Thus, the intract-
able, highly contested, close-to-home Israeli–Palestinian
conflict generates more varied narratives, including
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ethnocentric narratives, whereas the Syrian civil war,
where Israel is not a main actor and which is marked
by extreme violence, generates witnessing narratives in
the Israeli media. The unsurprising nature of the
detected differences may support the validity of the sug-
gested classification framework.
Our study is not without limitations, however. First,
the coding scheme is rather complicated, thereby not
lending itself to easy replication. Indeed, complexity is
an inherent feature of this classification framework, but
the coding scheme could well be simplified. Second, a
quantitative approach cannot fully account for some
important components of conflict narratives, in particu-
lar those associated with the symbols, ethos systems,
myths, and collective memories of conflicts, as well as
various visual dimensions. Third, despite the relatively
broad parameters of the study, our empirical investiga-
tion is limited by its focus on the Israeli media and the
particular six-month period of the sample. This may be
consequential for the types of narratives we identified,
since cluster analysis as exploratory technique inevitably
leads to solutions that are dependent on the empirical
material studied. Even within the Israeli context, a focus
on a time period with active peace negotiations might
have produced somewhat different narrative clusters.
Thus, future investigations need to address the question
of whether the narrative patterns identified in this study
can be generalized to other media systems and conflict
contexts.
Fourth, another limitation pertains to the meaning of
the identified narratives in relation to conflict escalation/
maintenance, or to opening opportunities for de-escala-
tion/conflict resolution. While the approach presented
in this article transcends the peace–war dualism, the
identified narratives do not map neatly onto a peace–war
continuum, and their possible effects remain at best con-
jectural. Ultimately, content analysis of news narratives
can go only so far and there is a need for examining the
reception of particular news narratives in political and
public debates. Another productive avenue could be
longitudinal content analyses, where the news coverage
can be examined in relation to actual developments in
the conflict. Such an investigation can also address a fifth
limitation of this study, which focuses on individual
news stories as short narratives rather than the unfolding
of conflict coverage over time as part of a serial narrative
(see Tenenboim-Weinblatt, 2008). Sixth, and finally,
while our classification framework attempts to address
the need for a nuanced approach that takes into account
journalistic practices and values, there is still a need for
investigating the factors that lead to the journalistic
production of different types of conflict narratives. The
challenge for future research is thus to systematically
connect the content of conflict coverage to both its pro-
duction and effects.
That being said, in exploring the complex and contex-
tual dimensions of media narratives, this study expands
on the important body of literature regarding the contri-
bution of the news media to public discourse about con-
flict, war, and peace, and consequently, to shaping public
attitudes and perceptions about conflicts and conflict res-
olution. In addition, with some adaptations, our sug-
gested classification framework may be useful for
assessing the construction and transformation of conflict
narratives not only in news content, but also in other
venues, such as individual storytelling in intergroup
encounters.
Replication data
The dataset and SPSS output for this study can be found
at https://www.prio.org/jpr/datasets/.
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